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AFTER THE ACCORD: 
Looking for an alternative 
economic strategy
Frank Stilwell
The econom ic policy o f  the federal g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  b e c o m e  in c r e a s in g ly  c o n s e r v a t iv e .  
Potentially progressive aspects o f  the 
Accord have been sacrificed on the 
a ltar  o f  c o n se r v a tiv e  e c o n o m ic  
orthodoxy. This article identifies the 
principal com ponents o f  current 
p o lic y , p o in ts  to  th e ir  lim ited  
effectiveness and adverse social 
consequences, and outlines a more 
progressive alternative.
The fo u r  main co m p o n en ts  o f  
curren t  policy a re  identified as (i) wage 
restra int,  (ii) financial reregula tion ,
(iii) reliancc on the J-cu rve  effect on 
the balance o f  paym ents ,  and (tv) 
increasingly restrictionist m acro-  
econom ic policies. The progressive 
al ternat ive  includes (i) a m ore broadly-  
based incomes policy, (ii) financial 
r e r e g u l a t i o n ,  ( i i i )  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
industry  policy and  p lanned  trade ,  and
(iv) a m ore  exp a n s io n a ry  p ro g ra m  of 
expend itu re  on  the social wage.
C u rren t  negotia t ions over  a new 
two-tiered wages system to  replace the 
Accord M ark  11 have clearly revealed 
the governm ent 's  co m m itm en t  to 
en fo rc ing  wage restraint.  As such, it 
has acccpted — as have som e sections 
of  the  un ion  m ovem ent the validity 
o f  the a rgum en t  tha t  wage restra in t  is 
the key to econom ic recovery. The 
ex ten t to  which the two-tier system 
would ac tua lly  lead to fu r the r  real 
wage reductions is not immediate ly  
obvious — som e g roups  of  w orkers  in 
powerful un ions would p rc su m a b ly d o  
better  th a n  they have done  under  the 
A ccord  M ark  11 bu t there is no 
d o u b t  tha t  the  im plem enta tion  of  the 
system by the  governm ent and  the 
a rb i t ra t io n  system would be m otivated  
by the objectives of  achieving a 
reduction in overall wage costs to 
employers.
W hatever  its dem erits  from  a
w ork ing  class perspective, this s trategy 
also suffers from the p rob lem  tha t  the 
u n d e r l y i n g  t h e o r y  is u n s o u n d .  
Lowered wage rates lower the  level of 
dom estic  dem an d  for  goods  and  
services and  the reby  underm ines  one 
cond it ion  for  econom ic growth. T rue ,  
w age cuts m ay also enab le  A ustralian  
firms to  com pete  m ore successfully 
aga inst  im porte rs  and  to  reduce their  
c o m p e t i t i v e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  in  
in te rnational  m arkets .  But w hether  
these gains in term s of  in te rnational 
com peti tiveness  outw eigh the effects 
o f  a m ore depressed hom e m arke t  is 
n o t  se lf-ev iden t.  M o re o v e r ,  the  
deva lua tion  o f  o u r  cu rrency  by over 
thirty-five percent in the last two years 
should  have given the  necessary 
com peti tive  ad v an tage  to  expo r te rs .  A 
coup le  m ore percentage po in ts  off  the 
ra te  o f  w age increases is hard ly  likely 
to succeed where th a t  massive 
deva lua tion  has failed. O r  is the 
objective to  press on  with such  drastic  
m easures  tha t o u r  waee rates are
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reduced to  the level o f  H ong  Kong, the 
Philippines, o r  Indonesia?  It is a long 
r o a d  to  t r a v e l  in p u r s u i t  o f  
in te rna t iona l  competitiveness.
T he  experience u nder  the  Accord 
has been o f  s ignificant wage-restraint.  
T here  is revealed in the  statistics on  the 
red is tr ibu tion  o f  income from  labour  
to  capita l: the  share  of  wages and 
salaries in the na t ional  income fell by 
five percen t between 1982-83 and  
1985-86, and  the  gross opera ting  
surplus  has risen accordingly. Profits 
have been a t  record levels. However, 
inves tm en t has  been low: only 
t h i r t y - t w o  p e r c e n t  o f  a v a i l a b l e  
investm ent funds  were used by the 
business sector  in the first half  o f  the 
last financial year, co m pared  with 
forty-six  percen t in 1982-83. It is the 
failure by business to  invest in 
expanded  productive  capacity  which is 
the basic p rob lem , not insufficient 
wage restraint.
D eregu la tion  o f  f inancial m arkets  
has been just if ied  by Bob H aw ke as 
having “ im proved the ability o f  the  
financial sector  to  al loca te  funds to  the 
m ost p ro duc t ive  uses". This sits oddly  
with the  evidence ju s t  cited o f  a 
declin ing share  o f  investable funds 
being used in A ustralia .  W ha t  we have  
observed is a m a jo r  rechannel ling  of  
funds in to  specula tive areas ,  and  into 
mergers and  takeovers  which involve 
financial gains w ithout add ing  to  
productive  capacity . W hat we have 
also observed are  m a jo r  increases in 
A ustra lian  investm ent ab ro a d :  this has 
risen in value from  $1.5 billion to  $7 
billion per  a n n u m  over the  last fou r  
years. M oreover,  there is no  evidence 
t h a t  d e r e g u l a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
inst i tu t ions  has led to  lowered 
interest ra tes  th rough  the effects o f  
increased com peti t ion .
In a s im ilar vein, de regu la ting  the  
value o f  the SA in the  foreign exchange 
m arke ts  was o r ig ina lly justified  on  the 
g ro u n d s  tha t it would lead to  a balance 
o f  paym ents  equilib r ium  a n d  reduce 
the incidence o f  specula tion  against 
the SA. T he  reverse has occurred .  The 
volatili ty o f  o u r  exchange rate  has 
been associa ted  with g rea te r  balance 
o f  paym ents  p roblem s, and  the 
incidence o f  speculation  on  foreign 
e x c h a n g e  m a r k e t s  h a s  r e a c h e d  
u n p r e c e d e n t e d  l e v e l s .  E v e n  
conservative  es tim ates  acknow ledge 
tha t m o re  than  n ine-tenths  o f
transac t ions  on  the A ustra lian  m arke t  
are purely speculative: even those 
t r a n s a c t i o n s  w h ic h  d o  in v o lv e  
e x c h a n g e s  fo r  th e  c o n d u c t  o f  
in te rna tiona l  trade are  often  timed so 
as to  take  ad v an tag e  o f  expected  
m a r k e t  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  In t h e s e  
c ircum stances,  deregula tion  ad d s  to  
the volatili ty  o f  econom ic  cond it ions  
and  underm ines  the capacity  of  the 
governm en t to  m anage the overall 
econom ic  system.
The hoped-for J-curve...is 
looking like "Waiting for 
Godot".
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’s p r i n c i p a l  
policy for  resolving the  balance  o f  
paym ents  p rob lem  has am o u n ted  to 
w ait ing  for the  com peti tive  advan tage  
generated  by the deva lua tion  o f  our  
currency  to  m anifest itself in h igher 
ex p o r ts  and  reduced im ports.  T here  is 
no  clear  evidence o f  this happen ing  
yet, m ore  than  one and  a ha lf  years 
since the  m a jo r  falls in the  exchange 
ra te  in early  1985. It is looking like 
“ W aiting  for  G o d o t”.
In fact, there are  som e very clear 
reasons  w hy the hoped -fo r  J -curve 
effect has  been so unresponsive. 
In terna t ional trade is influenced by 
m any  factors o ther  th a n  relative 
prices. S om e th ir ty  to  forty  percent o f  
t r a d e  has  been es tim ated  to  involve 
in tra -c o rp o ra te  transact ions.  Q u o tas  
and  o th e r  non - ta r i f f  restrictions are 
widely used by o th e r  countries ,  such 
tha t  A ustra lian  ex p o r ts  would  have 
difficulty in exp a n d in g  m arke t  shares 
even if they were m ore com peti t ive  in 
price. Bilateral t rad e  ag reem ents  are  
c o m m o n .  In an y  case, m uch  o f  
A u s tra l ia ’s expo r ts  a re  o f  p r im ary  
p roducts  whose prices a rc  determ iend  
on  in te rna tiona l  m arke ts .  The success 
o f  the devalua tion- led  recovery 
strategy d epends  m ore  on o u rc a p a c i ty  
to  ex p o r t  m a nufac tu red  goods,  and  
the m arke ting  expertise  in th a t  sector 
is often  consp icuously  lacking.
O n the  im port  side, the  deve lopm ent 
o f  A u s t r a l i a n  i m p o r t - r e p l a c i n g  
industries has  been likewise slow to  
materialise . S o m e  im porte rs  have 
tr im m ed  the ir  profit m argins  to  
m a in ta in  their  shares  o f  o u r  dom estic  
m arket.  In o th e r  cases, a t tem p ts  to
ex p a n d  ex p o r ts  have only  led to  an 
increased flow o f  im ports,  particularly 
in the form o f  capital equ ipm en t or 
o t h e r  i n t e r m e d i a t e  g o o d s  n o t  
p r o d u c e d  in  A u s t r a l i a .  T h e  
d ism an tl ing  o f  m a jo r  sectors of 
A ustra l ian  industry  has left the legacy 
o f  an  im balanced industrial s tructure 
which is seemingly incapable of  rapid 
im port-rep lacem ent.
T he  o th e r  m ajo r  p rob lem  concerns 
the “ invisibles” co m ponen t  in the 
balance o f  paym ents . This includes 
items such as interest paym ents  on 
in te rna tiona l  deb ts  ( tw o-th irds  of 
which has been generated  by the 
private  sector), tou r ism , shippingcosts  
associated with in te rnational trade, 
and  insurance. The negative balance 
o n  t h e s e  i n v i s i b l e s  h a s  been 
a p p ro x im a te ly  three times larger than 
the  t rade  deficit over  the last year. 
Since m any  o f  these “ invisibles” are 
no t responsive to  deva lua tion  o f  the 
currency , there is no general reason to 
expect a J-curve  effect to  operate.
Because o f  the  failure o f  the 
J-cu rve  to  materialise, the  government 
has re-oriented its macroeconomic 
policy tow ards  a  m ore  restrictive 
a p p ro a ch .  On this view, if devaluation 
w o n ’t reduce im ports ,  then incomes 
have to  be cut. T ha t  is the clear 
message in cu r ren t  m one ta ry  and  fiscal | 
policies. O f  course , defla t ionary ' 
policies are  an  ex trem ely  crude  way of 
resolving a balance  of  payments 
problem . In c ircum stances where | 
c o n s u m e r s  s p e n d  a b o u t  twenty} 
percen t o f  the ir  income on imported 1 
goods,  their  incomes have to  be cut by1 
$5 to  shave SI o ff  the to ta l im por t  bill, j 
T h e  a l ternat ive  is to  a d o p t  policies 
which d ivert expend itu re  aw ay from ! 
im ports  w ithout an overall adverse 
im pact on  the  level o f  national income, 
The governm ent 's  “buy Australian" 
appea l  com es in this la t te r  category, 
but the governm en t is clearly reluctant 
to  use m o re  systematic  m eans such as 
i m p o r t  c o n t r o l s  t o  r e d i r e c t  
expend itu re  to  dom estically  produced 
goods.
T he  irony o f  the s ituation  is that an 
increasingly restrictionist macro­
econom ic  policy is being adopted al 
the very time when econom ic  recession 
th rea tens .  G D P  grow th  has stalled, 
and  the registered unem ploym ent rate:j 
has risen aga in  to  over eight percent
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T raditional Keynesian prescrip tions in 
these circum stances would involve 
more exp a n s io n a ry  policy measures , 
including increased budget deficits. 
However, the  cons tra in ts  which the 
governm ent im posed o n  itself by 
adop t ing  the Trilogy have inhibited 
this response. T rue ,  the ta x a t io n  leg of  
the Trilogy was exceeded in the last 
federal budget,  but th e c o m m itm e n t  to 
a reduced overall deficit con t inued  the 
“deficit fe tish ism ’’which had  b cc o m e a  
general feature o f  fiscal policy in the 
preceding years. T h e  Keynesian 
notion o f  budgetary  policy being 
geared to the m an ipu la tion  o f  the level 
of dom estic  econom ic  activity has 
been jettisoned. In its place we observe 
a policy geared to  satisfy the 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
speculators. This  may be a  “ realistic” 
approach  in c ircum stances where 
financial deregulation  has given those 
speculators unpreceden ted  pow er  to 
destabilise the econom y. But even 
Keating's unexpected ly  low deficit 
figure o f  $3,5 billion did not satisfy the 
speculators, ju d g in g  by the response o f  
the foreign exchange m arke ts  in 
practice. Thus,  the governm ent is 
pushed into increasingly conservative 
fiscal policy in a vain a t tem p t  to  satisfy 
the  d e m a n d s  ol th e se  m a r k e t
partic ipan ts ,  even to  the ex ten t  of 
caus ing  a recession.
These four policy com ponen ts  
add up to  a p ro g ra m  of conservative 
e c o n o m i c  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e  
potentia lly  progressive aspects o f  the 
original Accord have been set as ide in 
the process. In certa in  respects, the  
current policies Can be seen as pav ing  
the way to w ard s  the more d racon ian  
measures advocated  by the New Right. 
O ne  obvious task for  the left is an 
opposit iona l  one,  em phasis ing  the 
inadequacies, inconsistencies and 
inequities o f  the  cu rren t econom ic  
policies. But there is also a need to  go 
fu r the r  in developing an al ternative  
econom ic  strategy, and mobilising for 
the  im plem enta tion  of  at  least som e 
aspects  of it.
The co n t inu ing  p roblem s o f  
u n e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  a n  a d v e r s e  
balance o f  paym ents  require a 
systematic and  selective p ro g ra m  to  
develop A u s tra l ian  industries. The 
n e c e s s a r y  p o l i c i e s  i n v o l v e  
coun te r ing  the de- industria lisa tion  of  
A ustra l ian  industry  and  p ro m o t in g  
em ploym en t g row th  th rough  im port-  
substitu tion ,  expo r t  expans ion  and  
industry  m odern isa tion .
These positive s tructura l changes 
will no t  com c d1>out au tom atica lly .
N either  can  the deva lua tion  o f  the  
A ustra l ian  do lla r  be retied on  to 
generate  them: as we have seen, the 
deva lua t ion  m akes  im ports  m ore 
expensive and  cheapens o u r  exports ,  
but it is all to o  c lear  th a t  this has no t  
reversed the balance of  paym ents  
deficit. Hence the need for  selective 
governm ent in te rvention  to  p rom ote  
im p o r t - su b s t i tu t io n ,ex p o r t  expans ion  
and  industry m odern isation .
Industry  deve lopm ent agree­
ments can  be developed as a m eans of 
achieving these objectives. T rade  
pro tec tion  and  bounties  cou ld  be 
p r o v i d e d  in  e x c h a n g e  f o r  
c o m m itm en ts  on jo b -c rea t io n  and 
m odern isa tion .  T h e  p rob lem s o f  
o u tda ted  and inefficient capital 
equ ipm en t  can be thereby  addressed .  
Indus try  deve lopm ent ag reem ents  
in v o lv in g  u n io n  a n d  w o r k f o r c e  
par t ic ipa tion  in the dec is ion-m aking  
o f  firms also open  up avenues for 
im proved industria l  rela tions and co ­
opera tive  p lann ing  of  the changes  in 
functions, skills and  location  o f  
em ployees in the  process o f  industry  
restructuring.
These sorts  o f  policies can  be 
ex tended  to  include incentives for 
innova tion ,  investm ent a l low ances 
and e x p o r t  m arke t  deve lopm ent 
grants.  Increased public  investm ent 
can  st im ula te  the deve lopm en t of  
A u s t r a l i a n  i n d u s t r y ,  u s in g  th e  
A ustra lian  Industries D evelopm ent 
C o r p o r a t i o n  as  a v e h ic le  fo r  
governm en t equity  and loan finance. 
S u p p o r t  fo r  new industries can also be 
provided  th ro u g h  m easures such as 
accelera ted deprec ia t ion  allowances, 
research and  deve lopm ent g ran ts ,  tax  
s u b s i d i e s  a n d  i n f a n t  i n d u s t r y  
p ro tec tion .  W ha t  is involved is not 
uncond it iona l subsidies to  capita l but 
specific a r ran g e m en ts  geared to  the 
provision o f  em ploym ent.
Selective im port  con tro ls  can  also 
be used in con junction  with industry  
p o l i c i e s  to  e n c o u r a g e  i m p o r t -  
subst i tu t ion .  This  t rade  regula tion  
involves the app l ica tion  of  the 
principles o f  na t ional  p lanning  to  the 
ex terna l  as well as  the internal 
econom y. W ithou t it A ustra lia  is 
locked in to  the uneven developm ent 
a n d  v o l a t i l e  s i t u a t i o n  w h i c h  
c h a r a c t e r i s e s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
econom y.
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It m ust  be conceded  tha t  such 
co n tro ls  m ay raise prices o f  goods 
b ough t  by local consum ers.  This effect 
needs to  be set against the  effects on 
incom es o f  not having the contro ls.  In 
practice , the benefits o f  having access 
to  an  a r ray  o f  im ported  goods  would 
be sha rp ly  eroded  by the falling levels 
o f  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  c o n s u m e r  
incomes. In cu rrcn t  circumstances, 
im port  contro ls  a re  needed to  prevent 
g row ing  balance o f  paym ents  and 
u n e m p l o y m e n t  p r o b l e m s  w h i le  
industry  policy brings a b o u t  a p lanned 
p ro g ra m  o f  im port-substi tu tion .
T he  original A ccord  clearly 
involved a c o m m itm en t  to  redress the 
cuts  which the  F raser  governm ent 
m a d e  in a reas  like health , education ,  
housing,  social security and  welfare. 
This  c o m m itm en t  rem ains incomplete, 
an d  is now  being reversed by the 
cu rren t  fetish of  fiscal restrictionism. 
It is the m ore  urgent in the  face of  an 
im m inen t recession. A p ro g ra m  o f  
e x p a n d ed  governm en t  expend itu re  
can  s im ultaneously  s tim ula te  dom estic  
p ro d u c t io n ,  mobilise unem ployed 
resources, im prove socio-econom ic 
welfare and  redress poverty. It is 
poten tia lly  o f  pa r t icu la r  im portance  in 
r e d r e s s i n g  th e  “ f e m i n i s a t i o n  o f  
p o v e r t y "  —  t h e  s t a r k  o v e r -  
rep resen ta t ion  o f  w om en  am o n g  those 
below the  poverty  line.
T here  is certainly much scope for 
ex p end itu re  which s im ultaneously  
genera tes  em p loym en t  and  satisfies 
social needs, e.g. in housing, t r anspo r t  
and  social services, N o th ing  could be 
m o r e  i r r a t i o n a l  t h a n  to  h av e  
unem ployed  people an d  unfulfilled 
needs for  social facilities and  services. 
E m ploym ent in the  public sector  has a 
key role in this respect.  Expanded  
governm en t ex p end itu re  can do  m ore 
t h a n  g e n e r a t e  j o b s :  i t  c a n  
s im ultaneously  meet specific dem ands  
t h a t  h a v e  e m e r g e d  f r o m  th e  
c o m m u n i t y ,  e .g .  f o r  r e t r a i n i n g  
schemes, im proved educa t ion  and 
com prehensive  child care facilities.
These p roposals  fo r  an  a l ternat ive  
econom ic  strategy can  be furthe r  
developed  to  include progressive tax 
reform , policies for technological 
change  and  la b o u r  retraining, selective 
p u b l i c  o w n e r s h i p ,  i n d u s t r i a l
d em ocracy  an d  na t io n a l /re g io n a l  
econom ic p lanning.  This p rovides  a 
f ram ew ork ,  no t  simply lo r  the 
m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  
econom y , but fo r  the cons truc t ion  of  
em b ry o n ic  socialist institutions, which 
ex tend  the principle o f  d em ocracy  into 
the econom ic  sphere.
W h a t  would be the  m ain  
c o m p o n en ts  o f  a m o re  progressive 
a l te rna t ive  econom ic strategy? T he  
f o l lo w in g  p o l ic y  p r o p o s a l s  a re  
presented  as  a  co n tr ib u t io n  to  the 
urgently  needed deba te  on  tha t  issue. 
T hey  build on  various ideas em erging 
from  the la b o u r  m ovem ent.  W hat is 
a t tem p ted  is to  synthesise them  in to  an  
in tegrated  p ro g ra m  of  policies which 
could  be implem ented to  deal with the 
cu rren t  econom ic prob lem s if on ly  we 
could  sweep aside the d o m in a n ce  of  
m o r e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  e c o n o m i c  
o rthodox ies .
The p roposa ls  are  presented  in 
tw o  parts .  First, a  set o f  fou r  policies is 
ou tlined  which directly  coun te rs  the 
fou r  policies discussed in th e  first half  
o f  th is  article, and  which is a  useful 
basis fo r  im m edia te p ressure to  
“change the  direction". S econd , a set 
o f  fu r th e r  policies is m ore  briefly 
ind icated  which could fo rm  the  basis 
for  building a transi tiona l p ro g ra m  to
What is unfortunate about 
the two-tier wages system is 
its tendency to narrow the 
focus of economic policy to 
wages policy.
a m ore  socialist-oriented econom y. It 
goes w ithou t  saying th a t  such a 
p ro g ra m  can be no  m ore  than  
u top ian ism  w ithou t the po p u la r  
su p p o r t  necessary to  m ake  it effective. 
How ever, it is surely useful to  have a 
vision o f  an  overall s tra tegy  within 
which m ore specific struggles can  be 
given direction  and  coherence.
incom es policy was a key element 
in the  original acco rd ,  designed to 
provide a brake on the infla tionary  
t e n d e n c i e s  t h a t  o t h e r w i s e  a r i s e  
because of  the vicious circle o f  wage 
and  price increases. It is also a potent 
m eans o f  influencing the d is t r ibu t ion  
o f  income.
The prob lem  is that the incomcs 
policy c o m p o n en t  o f  the Accord has 
no t been proper ly  implemented. Its 
narrow  concern  with wages policy 
needs b roaden ing  to  include other 
incom es such as professional Ices, 
executive salaries and  income from 
capita l in the fo rm  of interest,  rent and 
d ividends. The evidence clearly 
indicates tha t the  limited incomes 
policy under  the  Accord has favoured 
cap ita l a t  the expense  of  labour. A 
m ore  broadly-based incomes policy 
can  redress this imbalance while 
re ta in ing  the advan tages  o f  an  orderly 
w a g e - f i x a t i o n  s y s t e m  o v e r  a 
deregulated  system in which the 
pow erful gain a t  the  expense of the 
weak.
In the  im m edia te  contex t,  what is 
u n fo r tu n a te  in this respect about the 
proposed  two-tier wage system is its 
tendency to  narrow  the focus of 
econom ic  policy to  wages policy — as. 
it has  often been argued , has been the 
tendency  with the  Accord since its 
inception. M oreover,  while there is a 
fo rm al conncct ion  with a more 
b roadly-based  p ro g ra m  o f  control 
over  prices and  non-wage incomes and 
policies which link wages policy with 
o the r  aspects o f  econom ic  policy such 
as  investment,  technological change 
an d  la b o u r  retrain ing, it is hard to see 
this being im plem ented  in practice, 
given the  g o v e rn m e n t’s record. The 
task is to  re-establish the need for 
incomes policy to  em brace  m ore than 
wages policy: even w ithin its own 
f ram e o f  reference, the government’s 
call for  “ restra int with equ ity” is 
vacuous  w ithou t  this b roade r  policy 
focus.
In a sim ilar vein there is a  clear ease 
for s tr ic ter  pricc contro ls .  The creation 
o f  an  equ i tab le  incomes policy I 
requires such contro ls  as an  indirect j  
chcck on excess profits. T he  existing 
opera tions  of  the Prices Surveillance 
A u tho r i ty  are inadequa te  in this 
r e g a r d  a n d  s t r o n g e r  legislative 
provisions are  necessary. In conditions j 
where there is a resurgence of 
i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e s  t h i s  is 1 
particularly  im por tan t .  It should be 
stressed th a t  this p roposa l  is not 
in tended to  involve a wholesale! 
replacem ent o f  the pricc system by 
bureaucra tic  decisions. The principal ‘ 
ta rge t is m onopo ly  and  collusive
I
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oligopoly pricing. In much o f  the 
e c o n o m y ,  p r i c c s  a r e  a l r e a d y  
“ad m in is te red ” ra the r  than  set by a 
com prehensive m a rk e t  m echanism . 
W hat this p roposa l  involves is a 
change in the fo rm  o f  adm inistered  
pricing from  one geared exclusively to 
p rofi t -m ax im isa t ion  to  one  in which a 
wider range o f  social and  econom ic 
criteria is applied.
T h e  federal g o vernm en t 's  policies 
o f  deregulation  have increased the 
econom ic power o f  financial and  
speculative interests. This is a  m ajor  
constra in t on  the  possibilities fo r  o the r  
m ore progressive econom ic and social 
policies. It needs to  be reversed in 
order  to  reassert a g rea ter  degree  of 
national econom ic  con tro l .
M ost obviously, there  is a  need to 
m ake o u r  eco n o m y  less vu lnerab le  to 
fluctuations in the exchange  rate. The 
H aw ke-K eating  decision to  float the 
dollar on  in te rna tiona l  m oney  m arkets  
may well tu rn  ou t to  be co m p a ra b le  to  
G ough W h it la m ’s dec ison  to  ap p o in t  
Jo h n  Kerr as G overnor-G enera l .  The 
c o n s e q u e n t  p o w e r  o f  c u r r e n c y  
speculators over dom estic  econom ic  
m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  b e e n  c l e a r l y  
illustrated by the m a jo r  falls in the 
value of  the  A us tra l ian  dollar.  The 
need  f o r  a g r e a t e r  d e g r e e  o f  
m anagem ent o f  the currency  has com e 
to be acknow ledged  and  has  been 
reflected recently in a grea ter  degree of 
Reserve Bank in tervention to  stabilise 
the m arket.  M oving  back to  a 
situation of  a fixed exchange  rate docs 
no t e l i m i n a t e  th e  p r o b l e m  o f  
speculation — indeed, there  is always 
the p roblem  of “ bu n ch in g ” of 
speculative m ovem ents  when periodic 
adjustm ents  to the ra te  are an tic ipated
— but it would reduce the effects of 
short- term  speculative activities which 
have had  a continuously destabilising 
effect and  have imposed m ajor 
constra ints  on  o th e r  m acroeconom ic  
policies.
F irm er exchange contro ls  on  capital 
movements a re  a lso  needed. Foreign 
investment is an  im p o r ta n t  influence 
on the changing  s truc tu re  of  the 
Australian econom y, though  much of  
it takes place o u t  o f  past profits o f  
foreign enterprises opera t ing  in 
Australia. T igh ter  F ore ign  Investm ent 
Review Board guide lines a re needed to  
limit the  vulnerabili ty  o f  o u r  econom y
to in te rna tiona l  cap ita l m ovem ents ,  
much of  which involves p roper ty  
specula tion  and  takeovers  o f  firms 
ra the r  th a n  investm ent in add i t iona l  
p roductive  capacity .  P erm ission  to  
raise foreign loans c a n  be linked to 
c r i t e r i a  o f  l o c a l  e m p l o y m e n t  
generation  and  local p rocu rem en t  of 
goods and  services. R egula tions are  
needed also to  con tro l  the ex ten t o f  
profit and  dividend repa tria t ion  
overseas and the  ex ten t  o f  overseas 
c o rp o ra te  deb t repaym ent,
What is ultimately at issue 
is the social control of the 
investment process.
W hat is u ltim ately  a t  issue is the 
social co n tro l  o f  the investm ent 
process. The social pow er  o f  private 
p roper ty  exercised th ro u g h  profit- 
o r ien ted  dec is ion-m aking  processes 
m ust becom e subject to  social 
regulation  a n d  contro l .  O therwise 
public policy rem ains a t  the mercy of 
cap ita l strikes, transfe r  pricing and  
d e s t a b i l i s i n g  c a p i t a !  m o v e m e n t s .  
Likewise, an  a l ternat ive  econom ic  
strategy m ust involve a  g rea ter  
em phasis  on  econom ic  p lann ing  ra the r  
than  sim ply  respond ing  to  m arke t 
cond it ions . .  In a sense, econom ic  
p lanning  a lready  exists — a system o f  
p l a n n i n g  by  la rg e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
designed to  reduce the uncertain ties  o f  
the  m arket.  An al ternat ive  econom ic 
s tra tegy  would seek to replace this by 
p lanning  to  serve a b ro ad e r  range of  
socio-econom ic a n d  environm enta l  
objectives. Initially, th is co u ld  take the 
fo rm  o f  indicative planning, but 
increased public ow nership ,  import 
con tro ls  and  regula tion  o f  foreign 
i n v e s t m e n t  w o u ld  p r o v id e  th e  
p recond it ions  for  m ore  effective 
overall con tro l  o f  the  a l loca tion  of 
resources.
P lann ing  is no  genera! panacea,  
despite  its co n n o ta t io n s  o f  rationality  
and foresight. At the na t iona l level 
there is a po ten tia l  conflict between 
econom ic  p lann ing  as a technical 
exercise and  as a process involving 
w i d e s p r e a d  p u b l i c  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
D ecentra l isa tion  offers a partial 
so lu tion .  Because of  the  size and  
d istinct pa t te rns  of  deve lopm ent of
d i f f e r e n t  r e g io n s  in  A u s t r a l i a ,  
d ecen tra l isa tion  on  a regional basis is 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p r o p r i a t e .  T h e  
d eve lopm ent o f  a  system o f  in tegrated  
regional p lann ing  would involve 
identifying the resources ava ilab le  and  
policy ins trum ents  ap p ro p r ia te  for  the 
deve lopm ent needs o f  each region. 
Likewise, the ex tended  app l ica tion  o f  
industria l  dem ocracy  poten tia lly  has  a 
m a jo r  role to  play in a  transi tiona l 
p ro g ra m ,  con tr ibu t ing  im m edia te ly  to 
p roductiv ity  while also  laying the  basis 
fo r  m ovem ent tow ards  a m ore  
e g a l i t a r i a n  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  
econom ic  system.
T h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  a r e  w id e -  
ranging, b u t  toge ther  they  can  form  
the  bas is  fo r  a  cohe ren t  a l ternat ive  
econom ic  strategy. In effect, they  build 
on the progressive features o f  the 
original A ccord ,  but app ly  the 
principles o f  equity  and  regulation  
m ore  consistently  to  all aspec ts  o f  the 
econom ic  system. The principal 
a l t e r n a t i v e  is f o r  g o v e r n m e n t  
econom ic  policy to  slide fu r the r  in to  
conservative  econom ic  m anagem en t  
in the  futile a t te m p t  to  satisfy the 
insatiable d e m a n d s  of  specula tors  and  
m ult ina t iona l  capital.
T he m a in  political p recond it ion  
for this a l te rna t ive  econom ic  s trategy 
is w idespread  p o p u la r  su p p o r t .  It 
needs th a t  s u p p o r t  to  establish its 
place on the  political agenda.  It would  
need th a t  su p p o r t  to  defend the  
p r o g r a m  f r o m  t h e  p r e d i c t a b l e  
responses o f  vested interests  in the 
nat ional and  in te rna tiona l  econom y. 
However, given th a t  su p p o r t ,  the re  is 
the  po ten tia l f o r a n  econom ic  p rog ram  
which replaces reliance on inequitable, 
v o la t i l e  a n d  d i s r u p t i v e  m a r k e t  ' 
processes with d em o cra t ic  con tro l  
over the e c o n o m ic  system. The 
c o n f l i c t s  a n d  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  
associa ted  with the  A ccord  an d  its 
renegotia t ion  m ake  the  considera t ion  
o f  this  progressive a l ternat ive  all the  
m o re  necessary.
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